Phillies Scouting Director Johnny Almaraz Steps Down

[fish]

First, there is data in the three years following the draft. I discount draft-year stats, but the stats over the next two seasons certainly do have meaning. If they don't have meaning, this really is equivalent to saying that the Phillies current analytical assessment of potential college draftees does not have merit, because stats for a 18-20 year old can't be meaningful.
The development objectives are valid only insomuch as the team's pre-draft evaluation of the prospect was essentially correct. The fan often can tell what the development objectives are -- for example, we know that Galvis was put on an off-season strength program and there has been public mention of expecting Moniak to hit better as he gains strength. Just watching the games, a fan can tell when a pitcher is working on a particular pitch. In the minors one sees pitchers throw almost all FB in one inning, then almost all bendy pitches or change-ups the next, when this is not a second time through the line-up thing and when it is reasonable to assume that strategically alternating pitch types in the same at bat would be more effective. Then, of course, the team will speak of changes to its approach to hitting and pitching in a way suggesting that it applies to most players at all levels -- certainly a clear window into development plan.

You clearly believe you're rebutting my comment. My reaction, though, is that what you've written is an example of a fan believing he knows more than he actually knows.

Long-term, one can evaluate a draft class performance by looking at what that draft class actually contributes, at the major league level. We cannot do that in the short term. Full stop.

What we have in the short term are "other things." Amateur performance; scouting reports; low minors stats; sportswriters/pundits opinions; personal observations.

It would be interesting - but I think difficult - to evaluate how those "other things" as applied in, for example, 2005, to the 2000 draft classes, actually stack up to what those classes eventually produced at the major league level. There's an implicit assumption that those "other things" correlate reasonably well with actual long-term performance. What I'm suggesting is that we don't know that; we mostly believe it to be true, but that may be because we really want it to be true. That's the way the human mind works, if we don't actively defend against it.

I think there is one variable that is huge that never gets discussed in the argument that “you can’t judge a draft for 5 years”. Yes, you have to temper enthusiasm for the likes of Baby Aces in low A. What you don’t have to do is hold your breath on 3 guys in a rotation in low A that are getting killed every time out.

The idea that you can’t judge a draft is that guys who look good have a high likelihood of not panning out. If you have drafts where nobody really looks like a real prospect or big league regular, well, yes you can judge that draft. 2017 has been a wonderful draft for the Phils. A big leaguer, and lots of prospects. 2016 and 18 were bad (outside of Bohm).

[Austinfan]

Actually the last three drafts are pretty good overall:

2016: Gowdy (#42), Romero (4th), Irvin (5th), Dyer (8th), Stephen (11th),

2017: Howard #45, Seabold #83, Lindlow (5th), Maton (7th), Brogdon (10th), Parkinson (12th), Warren (14th), Dohy (16th), Listi (17th), D Jones (18th), Russ (19th), Hernandez (20th), B Brown (33rd), Stewart (39th)

2018: Simmons (6th), O'Hoppe (23rd), [no 2nd or 3rd, jury out on the rest of the draft]

2019: Miller (4th), Schultz (6th), way too early to judge the rest of this draft

2016 is ok, if Gowdy can come back, it'll be better, Romero struggled but is hitting 95 in the AFL, Dyer has promise as a RP and Stephen is on the fast track to the majors

2017 is one of the best Philly drafts of all time, could produce 2-3 starters and a half dozen players or more.

2018 really depends on Simmons, if he's the real thing (5 tool star) then it is a great draft, if not, below average.

[phillychuck]

Did you forget Bohm and Eastman from 2018? If Bohm is really excellent the rest of the draft is almost irrelevant. One great pick makes a draft. Look at 2000...Chase Utley #1, no one else with more than a replacement level MLB career (and few of those). Still, a great draft. 63 fWAR in one player.

And 2016 is awful. You are hanging your hat on Romero, who has been horribly inconsistent in the minors, and Stephen, who had a nice year in Reading but is not in anyone's top 20 prospects for the team. Irvin is likely a replacement-level #5 starter, and Gowdy is throwing in the mid-80s. I'd bet right now that draft will produce less than 10 fWAR, and I like Moniak and Stephen more than most.

[Austinfan]

I was skipping 1st rd picks, those should be close to no brainers inside the top 15.
Scouts/GMs earn their money after the 1st rd.

But a good draft is basically 1 above average starter, 1 starter/top bench guy, and a couple depth guys.
Land two above average starters and that's a very good draft, throw in 3-4 bench/depth/RPs and it becomes a great draft.

[julio]

But a good draft is basically 1 above average starter, 1 starter/top bench guy, and a couple depth guys.
Land two above average starters and that's a very good draft, throw in 3-4 bench/depth/RPs and it becomes a great draft.

If we're going to discuss "good drafts," we really should nail down these definitions up front - not in the middle of the conversation, and not in ways that are used to validate or rebut previously stated opinions.

We were discussing drafts in terms of total MLB WAR produced by a draft class. That's completely different than what Austinfan just offered. He's welcome to his opinion of what defines a "good draft,' but changing the definition radically midway through the discussion smacks of "moving the goal posts," if you know what I mean.

Personally - and notwithstanding the slipperiness of WAR, of any flavor - I found the "total WAR" approach useful, because it allows more-or-less objective comparisons of draft classes, across years and across organizations. I find Austinfan's characterization less interesting, because it's based on a bunch of subjective characterizations of player types; that could be useful if your goal is to have something to debate, but those types are so malleable that I don't think you get much real insight. I'm more interested in understanding than I am in scoring debating points.

[andyb]

Looking at the total draft compared to expectations, there is no way 2016 with the number one pick AND the largest pool (before they started shrinking the top pick pool) is a success without impact players (and lots of WAR which we only get if Moniak is a star).

2017 is looking like a very good draft because the top pick is meeting expectations and the 2nd pick is surpassing them. After those picks though it is hard to think that draft is above average. Seabold and Maton and maybe Dohy and Jones and Warren are in our top 20-40. None seems an impact prospect or even projects as a starter at this point though. Just about every organization has a half dozen picks that are progressing after 3 years but nobody else looks like a top 10 player other than the top 2 picks.

2018 and 2019 look good mainly because the number one picks have done what they are supposed to. After that, like 2017, there are no certainties or other top 10 prospects at the moment. Obviously hard to judge, but since so much of the bonus money is tied to the top picks, you have base much of the judgement on the progress of those picks. Bohm looks great offensively. Still uncertain defensively but he is as we projected. And Stott dropped a bit below where he was projected to go and that looks like a good break so far.

[Austinfan]

If you're going to use total WAR, then you also have to determine expected WAR based on draft position, then weight that by the strength of the draft - that is, both where you pick and how good that draft was determines expected WAR. But it's worse than that, because a draft could have high total WAR but no standout players at the top of the draft, so the normal draft value curve wouldn't apply that year.

There's no good metric that takes into account all these factors that I know of.

[andyb]

Total WAR is as good as we have though. And since bonuses can be spread around, it is a bit less dependent on the top pick. And yes of course I agree that the draft position matters greatly. Which is why 2016 was a disaster. And Bohm has a high bar to meet expectations (he is so far).

[allentown]

But a good draft is basically 1 above average starter, 1 starter/top bench guy, and a couple depth guys.
Land two above average starters and that's a very good draft, throw in 3-4 bench/depth/RPs and it becomes a great draft.

So, let's say a 'starter' is the 8 position players, 5-man rotation, and the top 2 relievers. That's 15 guys. Now we must ask ourselves: how long can we expect these guys to be in the core of their careers, i.e. performing at the level of an above average starter -- even throwing in years of slightly below average starter. I doubt it is 10 years on average, although star players can exceed this time. I'm going to use 7 seasons. If I do that, then I need your 1 above average starter/ 1 starter/key bench guy to fill 14 spots on the roster. Assume about 30% of roster should be coming from international. So 9 of 25 man-roster and 5 of 'starters' come from international. To fill the other 10 starter spots, with a 7.5 year core career, you need to get a little less than 1-1/2 guys per draft. To fill out the other domestic-sourced roster spots, you need another 8 guys out of the draft. So you need a little over 2 guys/draft to fill the starting roster.

Then comes the depth. Counting only guys with at least 10 ABs, the Phillies had 20 position players in 2019 and an astonishing 28 pitchers who logged at least 5 IP. So that is another 22 guys in addition to the 26-man starting roster. These are perhaps 10 of the guys who start the season on the 40-man, rather than 26-man, roster and then a combination of guys that didn't quite make 40-man plus a lot of fungible minor league AAAA vets. I'll count them as needing to be home-grown, since they had to start as some team's draft choice or international sign and farm system product, with a few independent league exceptions. These guys often don't really have a core career, or are former starters past their core, but what I'll call their productive career tends to be short. I'll say an average 5 seasons or partial seasons in MLB. We have 42 depth guys, let's say 28 of them domestic. For a 5 year productive career, an average team has to produce 5 from each draft. That's all the guys you list, and more.

Btw, I don't see how you analyze a draft and skip first rounders. A good first rounder drives a draft and that is where the big pile of money goes. A good draft starts and frequently almost ends with getting the first, supplemental, and 2nd rounds right.

Look at the players you list from the 2016 draft, where we had the top slot: Gowdy (#42), Romero (4th), Irvin (5th), Dyer (8th), Stephen (11th). A lot of questions about all of them. Of the group, Stephen had the most encouraging year, with the best stats of the lot and the biggest improvement. It was Reading so offensive stats can be inflated, but he had a big increase in his walk rate in addition to the big increase in HRs and ISO. Gowdy pitched not all that much, with more walks than Ks and is Rule 5 eligible next year -- like Ortiz this winter, if the world loves him after next season, they likely can have him for $50K. Romero was better than his ERA at Reading -- Although he gave up one more run per game, for believers in the 3 true outcomes, he improved in each of the 3 -- susbstantially in BB/9 so we can label him unlucky. He fell apart in AAA, but at age 22 remains a strong prospect. Certainly the best prospect of the guys you listed, if not the best season by stat. I think Irvin will fall into the MLB depth category. He put up a nice AAA season at age 25 but faltered in Philly, because his HR and BB rates increased. Dyer looks like he can be in Philly as middle relief depth next season. Good K rate. My conclusion: to date a very weak result for the first spot in the draft. If Moniak, Romero, and Stephen continue to progress it can be an okay effort in a draft in which we had the 10 slot. It needs a huge step forward in health and performance by Gowdy to be a barely ok draft for picking #1.

[allentown]

If Bohm can stick at 3B and be at least average defensively for his time of team control, then I think his bat is going to make him plus. He is the surest guy on the farm, since questions about Howard's health and durability..

[andyb]

Totally agree with that. Just realizing that every impression we have of Bohm is largely formed by his offensive stats. We just don't know much about his defense and the scouting reports are mixed. He looks like he could be a 4 WAR offensive player from where we stand now. It is just a different evaluation if the defensive WAR is -2 runs as opposed to neutral (0 runs). It is why Franco needs an 800 OPS to be a good major leaguer. Others might get away with a 750 OPS.

[schillingfan]

If you're going to use total WAR, then you also have to determine expected WAR based on draft position, then weight that by the strength of the draft - that is, both where you pick and how good that draft was determines expected WAR. But it's worse than that, because a draft could have high total WAR but no standout players at the top of the draft, so the normal draft value curve wouldn't apply that year.

There's no good metric that takes into account all these factors that I know of.

It’s hard to imagine that you would get high war without at least one all-star caliber player. That player, like an Utley or a Rollins is going to take up most of the war. You’d have to either get lucky with an all -star from lower in the draft like Howard or get number of above average major leaguers. I don’t think either happen much, because if you are good enough to do either,you are good enough to draft good at the top.

[Squire]

BA Ranked Every Team's Draft Performance in the 2010's Decade by War

Top 5
1. Houston Astros
2. Chicago White Sox
3. Florida Marlins
4. Toronto Blue Jays
5. NYMets

Bottom 5
26. Philadelphia Phillies
27. Kansas City Royals
28. New York Yankees
29. Milwaukee Brewers
30. Cincinnati Reds

[Philsmania]

Not a lot of success at the ML level for the White Sox and Marlins though. And the Yankees never had a losing season while the Royals got a ring. Interesting.

[andyb]

Draft position did not help. I imagine we rank a few places higher if there were a formula that accounted for that. Not good in general though.

Hopefully these rankings don't mean that much, because we hired someone that contributed to #28.

[phillychuck]

Draft performance by WAR ranking is not adjusted for draft position or picks forfeited to FA signings, right?

And the Yankees make up for their bad performance with international WAR I think.

[Squire]

Phillies First Pick in the Drafts in Drafts In question:

2010 - 27
2011 - 39
2012 - 40
2013 - 16
2014 - 7
2015 - 10
2016 - 1
2017 - 8
2018 - 3
2019 - 14

[andyb]

Our higher picks came late in the decade - hence less opportunity to accumulate WAR. Compounded by low or no first round picks early in the decade where there is more time to accumulate WAR.

I am not saying we were good at drafting. Just a system weighted by expectations would probably have had us somewhere in the 15-20 range. Below average, but the really low rating was hampered by late picks. Plus a dozen teams get those comp picks every year too.

[baseballoldie]

Here is an interesting article about the Phillies draft history compared to the rest of the league over the last 30 years.

Phillies drafts: boom, bust, and Bohm

The Klentak/Almaraz era still to be determined but not as bad as one might expect compared to the rest of the league.

[Squire]

Meet the man who can shape the Phillies' future

Salisbury piece on the new Scouting Director.